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BOOK REVIEW
Equality of Opportunity or Result?
AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY.

By Nathan Glazer. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975. Pp. 248.
$10.95.
Review by R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr.*
and Donald R. Stacy**
This volume appears at first blush to fall into a freshet of recent
writings on the limits of our capacity for effective social engineering.
Among these writings are Daniel Patrick Moynihan's Maximum
Feasible Misunderstanding,James Q. Wilson's Thinking About
Crime, and James S. Coleman's qualifying affidavit in the Boston
School case and subsequent articles. Upon full reading, however,
Professor Glazer's attack is seen to be directed more at the dubious
moral mandate for group statistical preferences than at their evidently doubtful impact on the social problems at which they have
been aimed.
Although Harvard sociologist Glazer is consistently arresting
and cogent as an ethnologist, one cannot as confidently rely upon
him as an historian, political scientist, or legal scholar. For example,
Glazer posits that there was a liberal and humane consensus in the
mid-60's-exemplified by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, and the Immigration Act of 1965-that race and
national origin ought not in any way affect an individual's entitlement. Glazer further hypothesizes that single-minded bureaucrats
aided and abetted by unrepresentatively liberal and personally unaffected lawyers and judges have skillfully enticed us away from this
humane and liberal consensus.
Glazer, however, is over-selective with the data upon which he
bases his finding of a consensus. The rigorous coherence he describes
did not characterize the mid-60's, and the public temper was more
ambiguous than Glazer recalls. The statutes that he adduces probably indicated nothing more than a consensus that race and nationality should not be a barrier, and there is little evidence that their
* Member of the Georgia Bar. A.B., Princeton University, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1967.
** Member of the Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee Bars. Adjunct Professor of
Law, University of Georgia. B.A., Millsaps College, 1961; M.A., Vanderbilt University, 1963;
J.D., University of Mississippi, 1967; LL.M., Yale University, 1968.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:893

recognition for "benign" purposes had then been rejected. Glazer
omits any mention of President Johnson's June 1965 commencement address at Howard University in which he set out the rationale
of Executive Order 11,246, the source of the affirmative action requirement in hiring, which was issued a few weeks later. The President told the black graduating class that he sought "not just equality as a right and as a theory but equality as a fact and equality as
a result." The as yet not fully appreciated conflict between the
equal treatment language of the statutes and the equal results
stance of the Executive Order and subsequent judicial gloss on the
statutes, particularly upon Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, was
present even in the mid-60's. Those were years of expanding employment. The conflict among the statutes, their expansive reception in the courtroom, and the Executive Order is clearest in times
of shrinking or limited employment when to hire or retain one is
consciously to deny others.
It was as much the trade cycle as skillful bureaucratic seduction
that brought us acutely to reconsider the rationale for affirmative
action. Even though there has been since early 1968 an apparent
lack of presidential interest in, or effectiveness at, exerting leadership in domestic affairs, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
("OFCC") in the Labor Department, and the Office of Civil Rights
at HEW have not had the internal coherence or mutual cohesion to
exploit this lassitude. Glazer is clearly wrong in his notion that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council, created by
congressional mandate in 1972 and consisting of the Departments
of Justice and Labor, the Civil Service Commission, the EEOC, and
the Civil Rights Commission, is seeking to impose even more stringent employment selection guidelines than those issued by EEOC
in 1970. The majority of the agencies on the Coordinating Council,
as is reflected in its draft guidelines distributed for comment,' would
give recognition to a larger spectrum of professionally approved devices for the validation of hiring tests and would offer guidance on
technical requirements that courts have been chary of addressing.
Glazer is correct, however, in his understanding that the validation
of employee selection devices under the EEOC's guidelines is such
an expensive, beyond the state-of-the-art undertaking that employers are almost irresistibly prompted to hire and promote on the basis
of race or sex or national origin so as to avoid having to validate
1.
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clinically even the most obvious device. (Glazer here but echoes the
concern that Mr. Justice Powell voiced over so Orwellian a turn of
events.) 2 The EEOC's resistance to the Coordinating Council's issuing more realistic and readily achievable standards-standards that
are as professionally well accepted as the current guidelinesconnotes a disregard for giving usable guidance to the measurers
of competence in a meritocracy and a calculating preoccupation
with the complexion of the results. So standardless, nay, mystic
a notion of the "right" racial or ethnic mix has ironically resulted
in the EEOC's being adjudged to have violated the statute that the
Commission itself enforces when it selected a white over a better
qualified black to avoid having too many black district directors in
the region.3
Glazer, co-author of the earlier work, Beyond the Melting Pot,
is an accomplished ethnologist who makes his most telling points in
questioning the distributive fairness of the hiring preference implicit in affirmative action and the effectiveness for any purpose of
the further reaches of transportation for school integration. He
faults employment preferences for failing to embrace all groups that
have been victims of prejudice or privation meriting redress and for
embracing individual group members who have individually suffered no discernible prejudice or privation. The claim of preferential
treatment based on the Spanish surname of a Nicaraguan, Castillian, or Anglo-Saxon wife thereof highlights an absurdity of affirmative action.
Glazer's analysis of claims based on race differs from his analysis of claims based on national origin. The claims of blacks are
different in kind, not just in degree. A legacy of slavery and segregation sets them apart from the other immigrants. Although white
indentured servants likewise arrived in a state of "unfreedom," colonial statutes of the 1660's forward confirmed, as Oscar Handlin has
demonstrated,4 that the indenture of blacks did not necessarily expire, that their civil disability was heritable, and that black family
members were separately merchantable chattels.
Glazer's critique of affirmative action for blacks is that affirmative action is irrelevant to the staggering levels of unemployment
endemic to minority communities of our inner cities. This unemployment he attributes to lack of education, commercially useful
2.
3.
4.

Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975).
Rogers v. EEOC, 403 F. Supp. 1240 (D.D.C. 1975).
RACE AND NATIONALITY IN AMERICAN LIFE (1957).
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skills, and serviceable work habits-handicaps that preferential hiring cannot remedy. Blacks who have made occupational strides
under affirmative action have, in Glazer's view, those middle class
attributes that would have enabled them to progress even without
governmental intervention.
Glazer may well go too far in reckoning affirmative action irrelevant to the high levels of black unemployment; affirmative action
may instead be, in the logician's terms, necessary but not sufficient.
The further equipping of unemployed core-city blacks with the habits, skills, and attitudes rewarded by the market place may well
depend upon the regimen of community self-policing and selfdevelopment that Jesse Jackson so ardently propounds.' On the
other hand, Glazer's hindsight view of what opportunities would
have been available to those middle class blacks with merchantable
skills and industrious work habits absent the pressures of affirmative action requirements under executive orders and court decrees
would seem to be overly sanguine in many instances. The membership and even the guest policies of most (genuine) private clubs
casts legitimate doubt upon the willingness of the white and usually
also Christian establishment to move towards equality of opportunity when there has been no pressure to do so.
Affirmative action requirements will most likely continue to be
frequently used by regulatory and granting agencies as well as the
courts. Since affirmative action proceeds (albeit "benignly") on differences that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held to be constitutionally suspect classifications, affirmative action should be analyzed in terms of the constitutional doctrine of the least drastic
alternative. Agencies persuaded of their own rightness often trench
on constitutional limitations.
This is the warning sounded by Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in
DeFunis' and given but lip service by the New York Court of Appeals in the recent A levy decision. 7 Douglas would countenance special consideration of all those who overcome privation, not a racially
or ethnically defined few. Under the medical school admissions system attacked in Alevy, 8 black applicants and those of Puerto Rican
descent alone had their academic achievements separately screened
on the ground of educational, financial, and cultural disadvantage.
5.
6.
7.
8.
County

Give the People a Vision, NEw YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 18, 1976, at 13.
416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974).
Alevy v. Downstate Med. Center, 44 U.S.L.W. 2482 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).
Alevy v. Downstate Med. Center, 78 Misc.2d 1091, 359 N.Y.S.2d 426 (S. Ct., Kings
1974).
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The admissions committee apparently proceeded on the doubtful
and particularist assumption that doctors who are black or of Puerto
Rican descent will (or ought) return to tend the poor of "their own
kind" and resist the enticements of a middle class practice, thereby
fostering the state's interest in the health of minority communities.
New York's highest court, after explicitly rejecting strict scrutiny of benign discrimination, stated that it would suffice to ask
whether the preference is justified by a substantial state interest
and whether a nonracial or less restrictive racial classification would
serve the same purpose. The court first assumed the presence of a
substantial state interest and then skirted the question of a less
restrictive alternative by noting that the plaintiff was so far down
the waiting list (155th) that the manner in which the twenty-one
places taken by black medical students and those of Puerto Rican
descent were allotted did not merit further scrutiny. The court
adroitly sidestepped discussing so obvious a nonracial classification
as a commitment to work as a physician among the target community for a term of years, a provision commonly linked to fellowship assistance.
Glazer has overstated the affirmative action requirements of
the courts in the employment field. For example, the Supreme
Court did not adopt the entire EEOC guidelines in haec verba in
Griggs v. Duke Power Company Indeed, the Court has flatly contradicted the EEOC's guidelines by placing the burden of demonstrating the existence of less restrictive alternative personnel selection devices on the plaintiff rather than the employer."° Glazer can
further be faulted for ignoring the use by employers of patently nonjob-related selection procedures such as high school level verbal
aptitude tests for janitors. The effective date of Title VII was subsequently proved a less than propitious time for the introduction of
these tests."
In the housing area, Glazer's predictions of judicial activity
have been borne out by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hills
v. Gautreaux." Moreover, two recent lower court cases of even
greater potential impact have held that a municipality cannot ex9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
10. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(b);
cf. N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 51-52
(1975). In Washington v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. 1976), the Supreme Court gave to
evidence of construct or content validity that equivalent acceptance which some have argued
that the EEOC's guidelines deny it. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4794 n.13. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a).
11. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1971).
12. 44 U.S.L.W. 4480 (1976).
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clude families of low and moderate income by zoning only for detached, single-family houses with minimum floor space and lot
sizes, 13 and that the pervasive "red-lining" of integrated neighborhoods by financial institutions violates the 1968 Fair Housing Law.14
The authors of this review are troubled, however, by Glazer's possible implication that even the most dismal of black ghettos serve
cherished American goals and help "to maintain values which need
some degree of concentration to survive . ... 15
The "sharp distinction"'" drawn by Glazer between "voluntary" actions taken by local communities before litigation and those
in fact mandated by the courts is either naive or disingenuous. Some
school boards simply do not care for the notoriety, expense, and
inconvenience of being sued successfully. Moreover, Glazer ignores
the not infrequent political element of judicial intervention in the
school cases: for political or social reasons school boards sometimes
deem it necessary to be publicly ordered to take steps that they have
been instructed by their attorneys not to oppose in the off-therecord privacy of judicial chambers. Even Governor Wallace's wellpublicized posturing in the schoolhouse door was not followed by
extensive active resistance to the integration efforts then at issue.
Glazer's book is well and forcefully written. The occasionally
uneven quality of his objectivity is understandable in an erudite and
provocative polemic. Although the truly excellent quality of the
ethnological scholarship displayed in the book inevitably suggests
adverse comparisons with the book's occasional inadequacies of a
historical, political, and legal nature, Glazer's critique of affirmative action makes an estimably weighty contribution to a comprehensive and reflective dialogue.
13. South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1975).
14. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 2381 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
15. GLAZER, supra note 10, at 107.
16. Id. at 116.
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